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COMMENT
THE LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE III ON THE PROPOSED
JUDICIAL REMOVAL MACHINERY: S. 1506
The recent nominations of Justice Fortas, Judge Haynsworth, and
Judge Carswell to positions on the Supreme Court have once again
focused the concern of the public and the legislature on the behavior of
federal judges both on and off the bench. Debate over the nominations
has also drawn public attention' to Senate Bill 1506 (S.1506) (the
Judicial Reform Act),2 currently in the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery. S. 1506 is the most recent in a
series of attempts 3 to establish machinery by which the judiciary may
purge itself of corrupt or lazy judges.4 The bill would provide an
alternative for the removal of federal judges to the cumbersome article
I impeachment ' proceedings by permitting the judiciary itself to remove
1 See, e.g., Washington Post, June 13, 1969, at A26, col. 1; id., Aug. 6, 1969, at
22, col. 1.
The bill was originally introduced by Senator
2 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
Tydings as S. 3055, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). In the next Congress, it was
renumbered S. 1506 and reintroduced (on March 12) with minor technical changes
of no significance to this Comment. For a history of the bill, see 115 CONG. REc.
14909 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
3 H.R. 7423, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) ; H.R. 17, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ;
H.R. 3639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. 1201, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945);
H.R. 1197, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941);
H.R. 9160, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. 111, H.R. 5939, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1939); S. 476, H.R. 2271, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); S. 4527, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936).
4 The bill applies only to the federal judges sitting on the courts of appeals, the
district courts, and the specialized federal courts. The draftsmen may have restricted
themselves out of a feeling that removal of a Justice of the Supreme Court is of such
political significance that it should be accomplished only through impeachment by
Congress according to U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 2, 3. Furthermore, because the Supreme
Court is the only constitutionally mandated court, and the apex of the judicial branch,
removal of a Justice by means other than impeachment may be unconstitutional.
Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removat--Some Possibilities
Under the Constitution,28 MIcH. L. Rzv. 870, 897 n.73 (1930) [hereinafter cited as
Shartel].
5As used in this Comment the term "impeachment" embodies the entire constitutional process of legislative removal-from impeachment by the House of Representatives, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, through trial and conviction by the Senate, id.
§ 3. Impeachment proceedings have always drawn strong fire. In an ideal system
of judicial removal, the judge is free to make a judicial decision without threat of
removal; the judge and the judicial system are protected from unfounded public
charges; and minor behavioral deviations are corrected by suggestions from other
judges or other measures less severe than removal. Removal machinery should be
free from politics; confidential until the official announcement of the removal; handled
by a permanent staff which discreetly investigates and may informally point up minor
deviations to offending judges; and procedurally fair to the judge. Stolz, Disciplining
Federal Jtdges: Is Impeachment Hopeless?, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 659, 664-66 (1969).
See also Note, Removal of Federal Judges-Alternatives to Impeachment, 20 VAND.
L. REv. 723, 731-2 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Alternatives to Impeachmentl.
Removal by impeachment, however, falls short of the ideal. First, a judge's
politics-or the political implications of his decisions-may lead to his impeachment.
Stolz, supra 666; tenBroek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment
(1064)
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a judge following a finding that the "good Behaviour" standard of
article III, section 1 of the Constitution (defining judicial tenure) has
not been met. In addition, S. 1506 provides for the involuntary retirement of judges whose physical or mental disabilities prevent them from
carrying out their judicial duties.
The draftsmen of S. 1506 chose the Judicial Conference of the
United States to preside over removal under the bill. Presently the
Judicial Conference has twenty-five members (all federal judges), including the chief judge of each circuit, the chief judge of the Court of
Claims, the chief judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
and one district judge from each circuit. The Conference is convened
annually and presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States,
who is also empowered to call special meetings. The present duties of
the Conference include supervision of the business of the federal
judiciary and recommendation of changes in rules of procedure and
practice in the federal system.6 To these functions, S. 1506 adds the
trial of lower federal judges suspected of having breached the constitutional standard of good behavior. In the past, congressional bills
have preferred to give the judicial removal 7 power either to already
Since 1903, 23 MINN. L. REv. 185 (1938).
Second, by maliciously bringing false
charges against a judge, one intemperate member of the House of Representatives
could damage public trust in the entire judicial system-not to mention the imme-

diate effectiveness of the particular judge. See Shartel 878-79. Sometimes the
mere public threat of impeachment suffices to force a judge to resign. House
Minority Leader Gerald Ford highlighted the political nature of impeachment and
the power of one representative when he announced that, should Judge Haynsworth's
nomination to the Supreme Court be rejected, he would bring proceedings to impeach
Mr. Justice Douglas. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
Third, the Senate may expend much time trying a district judge whose personal
fate may mean very little on the national scene. The average time for trying
a judge is 16-17 days. 114 CONG. Rc. 4558 (1968) (introduction of S. 3055, remarks
of Senator Tydings); 87 CONG. REc. 8149-50, 8164 (1941) (debate on H.R. 146).
The trial of a judge on the Commerce Court took 30 days. tenBroek, supra 192 n.33.
By contrast, the debate on the anti-ballistic-missile system, the longest debate since
World War II on an item in the defense budget, lasted 29 days. CONG. Q., Aug. 8,
1969, at 1435.
Fourth, the fairness and due process of the Senate trial have been criticized. The
trial is in fact a travesty of due process. See 114 CONG. REc. 4558 (1968) (remarks
of Senator Tydings) ; 87 CONG. REc. 8149-50 (1941) (debate on H.R. 146, remarks
of Representative Sumners) ; Stolz, mtpra 667.
Finally, only "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" may
give rise to impeachment under article II, § 4: the "good Behaviour" standard in
article III, under which S. 1506 derives its authority, implies a broader standard
which may also include malfeasance in office. See STAFF OF SuscomM. ON IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL MACHINERY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST
CONG., 1ST SESS., MEMORANDUM: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE TO IMPEACHMENT, in 115 CONG. REc. 14912, 14913 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
MEMORANDUM] ; 114 CONG. REc. 4558 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tydings) ; Note,

Removal of Federal JvTd.qes-New Alternatives to an Old Problem: Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1385, 1387-89 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Note, New Alternatives to an Old Problem].
For other criticisms of the impeachment process, see J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT
JUDGE 194-95 (1962) ; Note, The Chandler Incident and the Problems of Judicial
Removal, 19 STAN. L. REv. 448, 455-57 (1967).

628 U.S.C. §331 (1964).
7 Judicial removal means removal of judges by judges.
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established courts of appeals ' or to a newly formed court with the sole
duty of adjudicating removal cases.9
This Comment does not propose to reinvestigate the constitutionality of judicial removal as an alternative to impeachment, 10 but
rather, assuming that alternatives are permissible, to review the constitutional bases for judicial removal, and to explore the limits that the
Constitution-especially article Ill-places on congressional power to
establish judicial removal machinery and on the form the machinery
must assume. Then the Comment will examine critically, against the
constitutional limitations, the proposed mechanisms of the Judicial Conference and the provision for direct Supreme Court review of the
Conference's decisions. As a result of this examination, the constitutionality and propriety of Congress' choice of the Judicial Conference
as the removing tribunal should be clearly established.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF JUDICIAL REMOVAL

Underlying S. 1506 is the philosophy that the Constitution secures
to the judicial branch the power to remove a judge, either because the
power is inherent in the separation of powers doctrine,"- or because a
breach by a judge of the standard of good behavior is traditionally a
justiciable issue.'
Both theories upon which judicial removal machinery may rest rely in part on the history of judicial removal in
England before the Constitution was drafted. 3 That a judge may be
removed for breach of good behavior explains only the grounds for
8 See, e.g., H. R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) (3-man "court of appeals"
chosen
by Chief Justice from any three circuit judges in the United States).
9
See, e.g., S. 4527, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) (composed of the 10 chief
judges of each circuit and presided over by the chief judge of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia).
10The constitutionality of statutory alternatives to impeachment has been hotly
debated by legal scholars for the past forty years. For arguments that impeachment
is not the exclusive means of removal of federal judges, see MEMORANDUM; Shartel
880-84; Note, Judicial Trial and Removal of Federal Judges: H.R. 146, 20 TEXAS L.
REv. 352 (1942) ; Note, New Alternatives to an Old Problem; Note, Trial of Good
Behavior of Federal Judges, 29 U. VA. L. REV. 876 (1943); Note, Alternatives to
Impeachment.
For arguments to the contrary, see Kramer & Barron, The Comstitutionality of
Removal and Mandatory Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The
Meaning of "During Good Behavior," 35 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 455 (1967); Kurland,
The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History,
36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 665 (1969) ; Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional?,
7 U. KAN. CiTy L. REv. 3 (1938); Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 135; Note, The
Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51 HaRv. L. REv.
330 (1937) ; Note, The Chandler Incident and the Problems of Judicial Removal,
supra note 5.
"1See MEMORANDUM 14914; 114 CONG. REc. 4559 (1968) (remarks of Senator
Tydings). See also 80 CONG. REc. 5935 (1936) (debate on S. 4527, remarks of
Senator McAdoo); Shartel 892; Note, New Alternatives to an Old Problem 139798; Note, Alternatives to Impeachment 727-28.
12 See MEMORANDUM 14914; 114 CONG. REc. 4559 (1968) (remarks of Senator
Tydings). See also 87 CONG. REc. 8166 (1941) (debate on H.R. 146, remarks of
Representative Hobbs) ; Shartel 881-82, 891-93.
:3 For a more detailed presentation of this history, see MEMORANDUM 14914-15;
Shartel 881-82.
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removal, not the mechanism. In England, judges might be removed
legislatively by impeachment.' 4 In addition, judges holding patents
of office from the king on "good Behaviour" were removable by trial
in the Court of King's Bench on the common law writ of scire facias:
this "forfeiture of office" pursuant to trial was in substance removal
from office for breach of good behavior." Thus in England judges
were removable both legislatively and judicially.
Both the above theories I justifying congressional enactment of
judicial removal machinery entail different constitutional approaches
based on different interpretations of this history.
A. The Separation of Powers Theory
The separation of powers doctrine underlying the Constitution17
implies that each branch has inherent, plenary powers to implement its
specified functions.'" The judicial branch has, among others, the
inherent power to discipline for contempt of court,' 9 to admit and remove attorneys, ° and, to some extent, to make rules of practice and
procedure." Included in the inherent power of each branch is the
power to discipline and, if necessary, to remove its members 2 -- a con14

The Convention might have chosen any of the three legislative means of removal existing in England at the time of American independence: attainder, address
of both houses of Parliament to the Crown, or impeachment. But in granting Congress the power to impeach, the Framers specifically forbade the bill of attainder,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, and rejected address to the President. 2 M. FAInRAD, THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428-29 (1911).
15 Shartel 883.
16A third theory based on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court is discussed at notes 134-48 infra & accompanying text.
17 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
18 See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 530, 531, 540 (5th ed. 1891). See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161,
163-64 (1926) ; sources cited note 11 supra.
19 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873):
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence
is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts . . . . The
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this
power.
See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966).
20 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 280-81 (1883); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333, 378-79 (1866).
21 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131,
143-44 (1888) ; Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 426 (2d
Cir. 1951) (Clark, J., concurring) (the Supreme Court has inherent rulemaking
power for the lower federal courts beyond the power given to it in the 1934 Rules
Enabling Act). The Court has made Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of
the United States under its own power. See 226 U.S. 627 (1912). For further discussion, see Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure, 49 HAzv. L. REv. 1303 (1936).
22See sources cited note 18 supra. Contra, Chandler v. judicial Council, 382
U.S. 1003, 1005-06 (1966) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (Chandler I):
This is clearly and simply a proceeding by circuit judges to inquire into the

fitness of a district judge to hold his office and to remove him if they so
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The presumption

that one branch possesses a certain inherent power is overcome only
by an explicit grant of that power to another branch of the Government
or by specific (explicit or implied) limitations on that power. 2
The constitutional grant of good behavior tenure to federal judges
requires that the judicial power to remove be limited to cases involving
conduct violating that standard.2 5 But the Constitution places no other
explicit limitation on the power, nor is it eliminated by implication by
the explicit grant of removal power to Congress. The impeachment
power granted to Congress does not necessarily negate judicial forms
of removal for several reasons.2 6 Under the separation of powers doctrine, the Framers seeking a legislative check on judicial behavior were
required to make an explicit grant of the impeachment power to
Congress. This legislative check, however, does not negative the
inherent judicial removal power because the Framers chose impeachment as one of several types of legislative removal existing at the time
of the drafting of the Constitution."
Article I gives to Congress the
sole power of "impeachment," not the exclusive power of "removal." 28
Article II gives Congress the power to remove officers "on impeachdesire. I do not believe Congress could, even if it wished, vest any such
power in the circuit judges.
One of the great advances made in the structure of government by our
Constitution was its provision for an independent judiciary-for judges who
could do their duty as they saw it without having to account to superior
court judges or to anyone else except the Senate sitting as a court of
impeachment. .

.

. We should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth

at all, this idea that the United States district judges can be made accountable for their efficiency or lack of it to the judges just over them in the
federal judicial system.
Justices Black and Douglas reaffirmed their views recently in Chandler v. Judicial
Council, 398 U.S. 74, 136-43 (1970) (Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (Chandler
II).
But assuming that alternatives to impeachment are permissible (a position not
accepted by the dissenters), the removal of a judge by other judges infringes no
more on judicial independence than does impeachment. In fact, because impeachment
has more potential for abuse, see note 5 supra, removal by judicial machinery may
better protect an individual judge's freedom to perform his judicial duties. Furthermore, the argument has been made that "independence of the judiciary" refers not to
the independence of an individual judge, but rather, to the protection of the judicial
branch as a whole from the encroachment of the legislative or executive branches.
MEMORANDUM 14915; Hearings on S. 3055 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements
in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
56-57 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.3055]. If this argument is correct,
then judicial removal of judges can never infringe on judicial independence. Finally,
the Supreme Court in Chandler II recognized that individual independence, although
essential to preserve a judge's freedom to make judicial decisions, does not mean "that
each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of his manner of conducting judicial business." 398 U.S. at 84.
23 115 CONG. Rsc. 14909 (1969) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
2
4 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) ; 1 J. SToRY, supra note 18, at §§ 525,
540-44.
25 Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
26
MEMORANDUM 14913-14.
27
Note 14 stpra.
28 Shartel 892-93; see Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 803,
827 (1916).
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ment" and not the power to remove "by impeachment." 2 Finally, the
difference between the kind of conduct for which impeachment will lie
and that which violates the broader good behavior standard implies
the existence of some other removal power.3
Notwithstanding the congressional power to impeach, the executive branch has been held to have the power to remove officers inferior
to the President and Vice President.3 ' By analogy, the congressional
impeachment power should not be found to displace the judicial removal
power.
B. The Congressional Enabling Power Theory
Because no court has yet exercised or even recognized an inherent
judicial power to remove judges, a stronger constitutional basis for
S. 1506 might rest upon a grant of removal power to the judiciary by
congressional enabling legislation 2 Whether Congress may authorize
the judiciary to remove lower federal judges depends in part upon
whether removal is a justiciable issue.
Undefined by the Constitution, the meaning of the term "judicial
power" derives largely from tradition and precedent carried over from
England. 3 At the time the Constitution was drafted, the English
system provided for the removal of judges holding office on good be34
havior tenure by trial under the common law writ of scire facias.
Because the Constitution neither expressly nor implicitly rejects a
similar exercise of removal power by American courts,3 5 the trial of a
judge's good behavior should be considered a justiciable issue.3 The
power of a federal court to act on any justiciable issue, however, is not
29 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4; see Note, New Alternatives to an Old Problem 1393.
90 MEMOANDUM 14913-14.
31 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) ; Shurtleff v. United States, 189
U.S. 311 (1903); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897); see Humphrey's
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Executor
32
Earlier bills establishing judicial removal machinery rested on this constitutional base. See, e.g., 87 CONG. REc. 8166 (1941) (debate on H.R. 146, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1940)).
33 United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 60 (1959) (Frankfurter &
Harlan, JJ., concurring) :
What proceedings are "Cases" and "Controversies" and thus within the
"judicial Power" is to be determined, at the least, by what proceedings were
recognized at the time of the Constitution to be traditionally within the
power of courts in the English and American judicial systems. Both by
what they said and by what they implied, the framers of the Judiciary Article
gave merely the outlines of what were to them the familiar operations of
the English judicial system and its manifestations on this side of the ocean
before the Union. Judicial power could come into play only in such matters
as were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster . ...
See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 563 (1962).
3
4 Text accompanying note 15 supra.
3
5 See notes 26-29 supra & accompanying text.
36 Shartel 880-84; cf. Textile Mills Security Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S.
326, 332 (1941). State courts have held that removal of a judicial official is properly an exercise of judicial power. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 300 Mass.
596, 598-99, 14 N.E.2d 465, 466-67 (1938) and cases cited therein.
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inherent: jurisdiction must be specifically granted by congressional
enabling legislation.

II.

THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENACT JUDICIAL
REMOVAL MACHINERY

If the removal of a judge is within the article III judicial power,
either because it is inherent in the doctrine of separation of powers or
because courts have traditionally treated the issue as justiciable at
common law, then Congress may establish machinery for the removal
of judges on trial of their good behavior. Whether the removal machinery legislation rests upon the separation of powers theory or the
enabling theory, 7 Congress has the power to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all
. . . Powers vested by this Constitution." " This includes the power

to implement the "judicial Power of the United States" 19 either by
granting jurisdiction to "Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court" 4
to adjudicate justiciable issues, or by defining the scope and procedures
for the exercise of inherent judicial power. To establish removal machinery is not to interfere with the work of another branch in violation
of the separation of powers, nor to violate the article I impeachment
power by establishing another form of legislative removal. By merely
providing the means for judicial removal, Congress is no more removing a judge than it is trying a case when a defendant is convicted by
a court established by the Congress, under rules of procedure approved
by Congress.
Whatever theory is used to justify the exercise of removal power
by the judiciary, that power must be exercised under article III."- That
article--and the Bill of Rights' provisions concerning trials 42 and due
8

7The congressional grant of power theory does deviate, however, from the
inherent power theory. The latter finds the power to remove implicit within the
constitutional grant of judicial power with no need for congressional action; the
former recognizes only that removal is a justiciable issue, and that judicial power
to act in this area must derive from congressional enabling legislation.
38

U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.

39 Id. art. III, § 1.

40 Id. art. I, § 8.
41An article III judicial power may not, under the doctrine of separation of
powers, be removed by Congress from the article III tribunals, particularly because it
involves the constitutional right of a judge to retain an office guaranteed to him upon
his good behavior, cf. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 106 n.9 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (Chandler II), and the finding of a constitutional factthe good behavior of a judge. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932). See
generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 89 (1965). The
continuing importance of Crowell in this area of constitutional law is evidenced by
the decision in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 514 (1969).
42 The removal of a judge is clearly not a criminal proceeding under the protection of the sixth amendment. See Simpson, supra note 28, at 819. Historically
an action at common law, the removal of a judge, assuming his salary is in contention as well as his office, is protected by the seventh amendment requirement of a
jury trial in civil actions. Thus, removing a judge by a writ of quo warranto (the
modern successor to scire facias) would probably require a jury trial. Removal by
jury trial could potentially deter a judge from making unpopular decisions for fear
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process-limit the exercise of the removal power. Most important,
however, is that judicial removal machinery implement and protect the
article III standard of good behavior tenure-the cornerstone of judicial independence. One interpretation construes this standard as protecting primarily the corporate independence of the judiciary; 43 another
emphasizes each individual judge's independence."
S. 1506 accommodates both interpretations, for it assures both corporate and individual judicial independence.
The notion of the corporate independence of the judiciary has its
roots in the separation of powers doctrine. The Framers of the Constitution established separate branches of government to prevent commingling of distinct governmental powers-thereby to avoid excessive
concentration of power in the same hands.4 5 It was particularly important that the judiciary-the weakest branch-be free from undue interference by any other branch,4 6 for
it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the
judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated
by the major voice of the community.47
Removal by an article III tribunal (that is, a tribunal exercising judicial power under article III) would eliminate any danger of encroachment upon the independence of the judiciary by other branches. Thus
the removal mechanism of S. 1506 must assure that the Judicial Conference is an article III tribunal lawfully exercising only judicial power.
That the removing body exercise judicial power alone also safeguards the independence of individual judges. Individual independence
does not demand absolute security, for a judge may at least be impeached, but it does demand that an individual judge feel free to act
justly and courageously in judicial matters.4" Each judge must be
convinced that he will in fact retain his office during good behavior, for
[t]he inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be
indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be
expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission.4 9
of later removal proceedings. But Congress can fashion a new remedy not under
common law and thus, under a statutory proceeding, avoid the jury requirement.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
43 See, e.g., MEmORANDUam 14915.
44
See, e.g., Kramer & Barron, supra note 10, at 467.
45 See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) ; THE FEDERAIST
Nos. 47, 48 (J. Madison).
46
See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); 1 J. SToRY, mipra note 18, at § 531.
47THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 509 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
48
See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 84 (1970); Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547 (1967) ; THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
49
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton).
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An individual judge must feel that the removal system is not subject
to political pressures or arbitrariness. Because the Conference functions judicially, as will be immediately shown, reasonable fears of
unjust removal are minimized." °
III.

REMOVAL OF JUDGES BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

A. Mechanism
S. 1506 establishes a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and
Tenure composed of five federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice
to serve staggered, four-year terms.5 1 Upon receipt of a complaint
about a judge's incapacity or misconduct, the Commission, if it believes the complaint not frivolous, holds confidential hearings to verify
it.52' The accused judge is entitled to attend these hearings accompanied by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present witnesses
and evidence on his own behalf. 3 If four Commission members ' find
the judge's conduct inconsistent with the good behavior standard, the
Commission recommends his removal." The Judicial Conference may
accept, reject, or modify the recommendation. 6 If the Conference
accepts the recommendation, it certifies to the President that the judge's
conduct has been inconsistent with the Constitution's good behavior
standard, and the judge is forthwith removed from office. An aggrieved judge may stay certification, however, by petitioning
for
5 7
Supreme Court certiorari review of the Conference's decision.
B. The Judicial Conference Exercises Judicial Power
Under S. 1506, the Conference functions like a regular court. The
Commission's power to conduct the initial investigation and hearing
is independent of the Conference's removal power: 58 no Conference
member may serve on the Commission. 9 The Commission investi50 Impeachment, a procedure which is clearly political and often arbitrary, represents little threat to judicial independence because of its infrequent use. A system
which may be used more frequently must employ more rigorous safeguards to
minimize feelings of judicial insecurity.
41 S. 1506 § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 377(c)).
2
Id. § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 378(a)).
OId. § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 378(b)). The hearing before the commission comports with due process standards set by the Supreme Court. See Jenkins
v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 427-31 (1969). Any judicial removal system must
meet these standards. Cf. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 512 (1873).
See ge;erally Note, New Alternatives to at; Old Problem 1401, 1404; Note, Alternafives to Impeachment 731.
54 S. 1506 § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 377(e)).
55 Id. (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 378(d)).
56
8 d. (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 379(b)).
5

7Id.
58 The Commission itself need not conform to the requirements of article III,

because it merely makes recommendations to the Conference. The judicial nature
of the Conference is not affected by the investigatory function of the Commisssion.
59 S. 1506 § 101(a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 377(b), (c) (3)).
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gates; the Conference hears and determines as impartial judges the
rights of parties coming before it. In effect, the Commission is the
Conference's grand jury or special master. Its recommendation for
removal is treated exactly as is a master's report to a district court
sitting without a jury under rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Like the district court, the Conference may adopt, modify,
or reject the report in whole or in part, or may gather evidence for
itself or recommit the report with instructions."0 Clearly the draftsmen
of S. 1506 contemplate that the Conference will exercise the "powers
of [a] court, generally." "
In the present form of the bill, the Conference has the power to
subpoena witnesses and to compel testimony; 62 and an amendment to
S. 1506 now being drafted would allow subpoenas of the Conference to
be enforced by contempt citations issued directly by the Conference.'
Under the unamended bill, the Conference must enforce its subpoena
in a district court with jurisdiction over the witness," but the Conference nonetheless exercises judicial power.65
To maintain its position as a judicial body, the Conference must
not exercise substantial nonjudicial powers. Its powers under present
law are judicial. The power to aid in the formulation of rules of
procedure in federal courts is no less judicial than the rulemaking power
exercised by the Supreme Court." Similarly, when the Conference
makes recommendations for the administration of justice in the lower
federal courts, it exercises a judicial power similar to that of the Chief
Justice.67 When the Conference is given the power under S. 1506 to
make rules of practice and procedure for itself, it is doing no more
than exercising an inherent article III power.6
60 Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e) (2), with S. 1506 § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C.
§379 (b)).

'01115 CONG. REc. 6230 (1969)
(outline of S. 1506 submitted by Senator
Tydings).
62 Id.; see S. 1506 § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 384).
3
Telephone conversation with Lee Miller, Deputy Counsel, Subcomm. on
Improvements in judicial Machinery, Jan. 9, 1970.
64 S. 1506 § 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 385).
'5 Congress has control over the form and scope of the contempt power in
lower federal courts. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1873).
The power of contempt granted to the Conference in the unamended bill is identical
with the contempt power given to district courts to compel testimony of witnesses
under depositions in FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Only a district court in the district in which
the deposition is being taken may charge a witness with contempt for refusal to
answer a question. Both the rule and the unamended bill appear to reflect the view
that a witness should be permitted to defend his recalcitrance in the district most
convenient
for him.
' 6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964); note 21 supra & accompanying text. For the
Conference's role in Supreme Court rulemaking, see 374 U.S. 865, 869-70 (1963)
(statement of Black & Douglas, JJ.) ; Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Rules, 58
COLUA. L. REv. 435, 443-45 (1958). See generally The Rule Making Function and
the JudicialConference of the United States, 21 F.R.D. 117 (1958).
67
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §292 (1964).
W See sources cited note 21 sutpra.
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Although the Conference does make rules of conduct for judges,

it is not empowered to do so by the statute creating it,6 9 and the rules

have only the force of moral suasion.'0 This power is nonetheless
judicial. Members of the Conference suggest standards of behavior
either in their role as members of the judicial profession exercising
a moral authority or as representatives of the lower federal judiciary
implementing an
inherently judicial power to supervise the administra71
tion of justice.
The Conference has also advised Congress on legislation.72 Unlike
the power to make rules of behavior, this power is granted by the enabling legislation, but Congress may have intended to limit this advisory function to legislation concerning the administration of the
courts. Extrastatutory practices of the Conference have been under
investigation by Senator Sam Ervin of the Subcommittee on Separation
of Powers."
But the Conference's primary functions under the enabling statute and S. 1506 will be to aid the Supreme Court in making
rules of procedure and to exercise its removal powers when necessary.
The extrastatutory powers it has exercised and its other minor functions
should not impair its major judicial role. Justice Harlan, writing for
a plurality in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok 7' and concurring in Chandler v.
69
See
70

28 U.S.C. §331 (1964).
That the Conference has the power to make only morally binding rules is
emphasized by the expressed discontent of some judges with rules made according
to "no sanction in law." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 1,
1969) (available in fall 1970); Telephone conversation with Lee Miller, Deputy
Counsel of the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Feb. 18, 1970.
In 1963 the Conference prohibited federal judges from holding offices in corporations for profit. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1963, at 74, col. 2. In June 1969 the Conference made sweeping restrictions on financial and off-the-bench activities of lower
federal judges. Id., June 11, 1969, at 17, col. 1. These latter restrictions were removed in November 1969 pending further action. Id., Nov. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
71 In a proceeding to remove a judge under S. 1506, the ethical rules of the
Conference would have only evidentiary force-the violation of a rule would not
constitute a per se violation of the constitutional standard of good behavior. Under
these circumstances, the Conference would not be exercising quasi-judicial power by
enforcing its own self-made rules. Judicial power must be distinguished from "quasijudicial power," which might be defined as the use of judicial power only incidentally
to further an agency's legislative and administrative powers and to implement a
statutory policy entrusted by Congress to the agency. See Pillsbury, Administrative
Tribunals, 36 HARv. L. REv. 405, 420 (1923). See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 227 (1908); In re Cumberland Power Co., 147 Tenn. 504,
511, 249 S.W. 818, 820 (1923). In exercising its full judicial power, the Conference
would be able to look to congressional definitions of conduct inconsistent with good
behavior. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 454 (1964) ; S. 1506 §§ 101 (a) (proposed 28 U.S.C.
§ 378(c)), 401(a) (proposed 28 U.S.C. §§ 390, 391).
72 For example, in November 1969, the Conference passed a resolution disapproving of the so-called Murphy amendment designed to curb activities of anti-poverty
lawyers. In 1966, the Conference approved pending legislation for wiretapping. See
Washington Post, Apr. 8, 1970, at A12, col. 1.
73 Hearings on the Judicial Conference and Judicial Independence Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1970) (available in fall 1970) ; see Washington Post, supra note 72.
74 370 U.S. 530, 582-83 (1962).
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Judicial Council,75 has emphasized that the primary function of an
article III body will not be impaired by incidental powers which are
of themselves not "judicial."
[M]y conclusion about the nature of the [Judicial] Council's
primary function under § 332 would stand even if it were
determined that one or more of the Council's assorted incidental powers were incapable of being exercised by an Article
III court. If I am correct in concluding that Congress' purpose in 1939 in creating the Judicial Councils was to vest in
them, as an arm of the Article III judiciary, supervisory
powers over the disposition of business in the district courts,
that purpose is not undone by a subsequent congressional
attempt to give them a minor nonjudicial task; it would be
"perverse to make the status of [the Councils] turn upon so
miniscule a portion of their purported functions." 76
For the Conference lawfully to exercise article III judicial power,
its members must all enjoy good behavior tenure.7 7 The members of
the Conference are all appointed to serve during good behavior on
recognized article III courts: they may appropriately hear justiciable
cases. That district judges on the Conference serve only for a fixed
number of years does not affect their tenure as judges or their independence. Members of the Commerce Court held similar staggered
and limited terms, yet the Commerce Court was undoubtedly an
article III court." And the permanent assignments of both the district
judges and the circuit judges to other courts does not affect their
ability to serve on the Conference. Members of newly created federal
courts have frequently been drawn from the already existing federal
bench; " and, of course, the three-judge district court is always composed of judges already assigned to the federal courts.8 0 When the
Chief Justice convenes the Conference,8 ' he is, in effect, temporarily
assigning the chief judge of each circuit,' the selected district judges
75398 US. 74, 95-111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (Chandler II).
76 Id. at 111 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
77 Merely designating federal judges to a post, however, does not of itself make

the tribunal
a judicial body. Id. at 107 (Harlan, J., concurring).
78
See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282, 299-300 (1912) ; 36
Stat. 540 (1910) (5-year staggered terms for judges on the Commerce Court, considered to be new circuit judges). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BusnEss OF THE Sur a CoURT 162-73 (1927).
7950 U.S.C. App. §924(c) (1964) (Court of Emergency Appeals, consisting
of "three or more judges to be designated by the Chief Justice of the United States
from judges of the United States district courts and courts of appeals."). See geterally Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
80 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
S Id. § 331. The Chief Justice's power of assignment does not usurp the power
of the President to appoint and the Senate to confirm judges. Lamar v. United
States, 241 U.S. 103, 118 (1916).
82 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 291 (1964).
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of the circuits,8 and the chief judges of the specialized federal courts,8
to sit at the trial of a judge's good behavior. Thus under S. 1506
all judges are acting in-their official capacity.
The Supreme Court has utilized a similar analysis to determine
that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
were article III courts constitutionally exercising judicial power. In
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,85 a plurality of the Supreme Court determined
that those courts, long considered legislative courts, 6 were in fact from
their inception article III courts, although Congress did not specifically
denominate them as such until the 1950's." Rather than relying on
the legislation declaring the courts to be article III courts able to
exercise judicial power, the plurality looked to the courts' "history, the
development of their functions, and their present characteristics." 8'
This reasoning implies that any congressionally created body meeting
the requirements of an article III tribunal is in fact created as an
article III court and may lawfully exercise judicial power. Because
the powers and functions of the Judicial Conference are those of an
article III court exercising judicial power, Glidden supports the
position that the Conference is lawfully exercising judicial power under
article III when it operates to remove a federal judge pursuant to the
mandate of S. 1506.
More recently, in Chandler v. Judicial Council (Chandler II), s1
the Supreme Court was faced with the petition of a district judge from
the Western District of Oklahoma challenging the orders of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit restricting his case load. Although
the Court denied on procedural grounds the motion seeking a writ of
mandamus or of prohibition, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
reached the merits. He found that the Judicial Council acted as a
judicial tribunal in regulating the exercise of Judge Chandler's official
duties; and concluded that the supervisory tasks performed by the
Council either were within the capacities of an article III tribunal or
83 Cf. id. § 292.
8

Cf. id. §293.

85 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (3-2-2 decision, plurality opinion by Harlan, J.).
86See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) ; Ex Parte Bakelite Corp.,

279 U.S.
438, 460 (1929).
87

Mr. Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren concurred on the ground that
Congress had specifically established the courts in question as article III courts by the
acts of 1953 (28 U.S.C. §171 (1964)) and 1958 (28 U.S.C. §211 (1964)). They
would not overrule Bakelite and Williams, but instead would hold the specialized
courts to be article III courts as of 1953 and 1958 respectively. Nevertheless, the
concurring justices agreed with the controlling opinion of Justice Harlan that the
name of a body was not as important as its functions.
Not that this [the acts of Congress naming the courts as article III bodies]
ipse dixit made the Court of claims an Article III court, for it must be ex-

amined in light of the congressional power exercised and the jurisdiction
enjoyed, together with the characteristics of its judges.
370 U.S. at 585 (Clark, J. & Warren, C.J., concurring).
88 370 U.S. at 552. The concurring Justices agreed with this analysis. See note
87 supra. See also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 459 (1929).
89 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
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were merely incidental to the Council's judicial functions and of little
consequence in evaluating its judicial nature.90 Under this view, the
Judicial Conference would similarly be acting judicially when it removed a judge pursuant to the provisions of S. 1506.
Thus, because the Judicial Conference is an article III tribunal,
exercising only judicial power, the corporate independence of the
judiciary is not threatened by another branch of the Government. And
the independence of individual judges is likewise sustained by the
Conference's exercise of judicial power alone. The federal judges
manning the Conference hold office on good behavior and are hardly
susceptible to political or financial pressure. The commission-conference system and the provisions for counsel and cross-examination
assure an adversary proceeding 1 of substantive and procedural fairness. To the extent that judicial behavior can be prescribed, the
Conference judges will act as impartial triers of fact and law. The
direct appellate review provisions of S. 1506 further emphasize the
judicial nature of removal by the Conference. In short, those factors
establishing the judicial role of the Conference also protect most
successfully the feelings of independence of individual judges, for the
safeguards of the judicial process assure fairness and impartiality.

IV.

DIRECT SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE

Because the Constitution confines the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to "Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party," 92 and because of the constitutional rule that the original jurisdiction of the
90Id. at 110-11 (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority in Chandler II misconceived the difference between "administrative" powers and functions and "judicial
administration," an exercise of judicial power. Id. at 87 n.8, 88 n.10. Justice Harlan
correctly distinguished the two, id. at 103 n.8:
I find little guidance for our interpretive task in . . . the terms
"administration" and "administrative" . . . . Those terms are not talis-

manic; they may, in various contexts, bear a range of related meanings.
Certainly the phrase "judicial administration" is often used to characterize
judicial tasks performed by the courts as incidents to their primary function
of rendering definitive adjudications of disputes.
Later in his opinion Justice Harlan states:
In Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 332 (1941),
the Court noted the range of relatively minor responsibilities, other than the
hearing of appeals, placed by statute in the courts of appeals. These
included prescribing the form of writs and other process and the form and
style of the courts' seals; making rules and regulations; appointing a clerk
and approving the appointment and removal of deputy clerks; and fixing the
times when court should be held. Each of these functions was to be performed by the "court." . . . I see little reason to believe that any of the
various supervisory tasks entrusted to the Judicial Council is beyond the
capacities of a judicial body under Article III.
Id. at 110-11 (Harlan, J., concurring).
91These attributes of the adversary system are probably required by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
(1969). For additional discussion of the Conference's assurances of the independence
of the judiciary, see notes 148-56 infra & accompanying text.
92 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This enumeration does not include jurisdiction to
remove a judge.
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Court may be neither enlarged nor contracted, 93 jurisdiction to review
the Conference's decisions must lie within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, which is subject to expansion by congressional enactment,' or
within the Court's inherent supervisory powers implicit in the article
III, section 1 concept of "judicial power."
A. Appellate Review
Temporarily putting aside jurisdiction stemming from inherent
supervisory powers, Congress may permit direct review of the Conference only if the Conference's decisions fall within the scope of the
Supreme Court's appellee jurisdiction. Chandler II, 9 recently decided
by the Supreme Court, broadly parallels a hypothetical removal situation under S. 1506. The Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, a body
similar to the Judicial Conference of the United States, found Judge
Chandler unwilling or unable to discharge his duties efficiently, and his
ethics and judicial competence questionable at best. Acting pursuant to
its power to make "orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit," 96 the Council
essentially removed Judge Chandler from his judicial duties by ordering
that no further cases be assigned to him. Before reaching the merits
of the Council's decision, the Supreme Court faced the threshold
question whether it could, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
(the judge had sought a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of
prohibition), review the order of the Council.
The Government as amicus curiae argued that the Supreme Court
could constitutionally issue a writ of mandamus to the Judicial Council
in furtherance of its appellate jurisdiction. According to the established
rule, the Court may not issue a writ of mandamus to an executive or
administrative officer, 7 but it may, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, issue such a writ to an inferior court.9 8 Because the Council
exercises the judicial powers of a court of appeals en banc, and because
it makes orders in cases and controversies, the Government urged that
it be treated as a court for the purposes of appellate review. 9 The
argument focused on the judicial nature of the Council's decision to
prevent Judge Chandler from hearing new cases:
93 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-75 (1803).
94Id. Over the constitutional history of the Court, article III, § 2 has been
interpreted to mean that Congress has the broad power to regulate, grant, or withdraw the appellate jurisdiction of the Court. See United States v. Young, 94 U.S.
258, 259 (1876) ; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869) ; Wiscart v.
Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327-28 (1796).
95 For the first Supreme Court decision in the case, see Chandler v. Judicial
Council, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966).
9628 U.S.C. §332 (1964).
97 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
98 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Chandler v. Judicial
Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
99
1d. 18-21.
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The key question, therefore, is whether a judicial council
is, for these purposes, a "lower court" or "inferior tribunal"
whose decisions are reviewable in the exercise of this Court's
appellate jurisdiction, rather than an administrative agency
whose personnel happen also to serve as circuit judges. In
our view, at least insofar as a Council is acting to direct the
conduct of judicial business by district judges, it is functioning both in form and in substance as a judicial tribunal within
the compass of Article 111.10°
The majority denied the writ on technical grounds,""' but three
justices-Black and Douglas in their dissent'.2 and Harlan in his
concurrence 1 03-accepted the Government's point of view. Thus, although the law is unsettled in the federal system, one emerging view
indicates that decisions of judicial bodies exercising judicial power may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court on appeal or certiorari.
1. The Functional Standard of Appellate Review:
Exercise of Judicial Power
The power of Congress to create additional appellate jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court is bounded only by the limitations on the scope
of judicial power in article III, section 2. The Constitution limits the
Court's review to cases and controversies 104 involving the exercise
of federal power.'
In state court decisions, appellate review has been described simply
as the review by a superior court of a case decided by an inferior
court.'0 " This definition, however, is not necessarily applicable to the
Federal Constitution, which does not designate any specific inferior
courts to which the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
limited, but defines the appellate jurisdiction in terms of the cases and
controversies the Supreme Court may hear, leaving Congress to imple100 Id. 17.
10 The Court decided that since the Council's order limiting Judge Chandler's
power to bear cases had been terminated by a subsequent council order, and since
Judge Chandler evidenced no disagreement with the disposition contained in that
order, a case for the issuance of the requested writs had not been made out. 398
U.S. at 88-89.
102 Id. at 133-34 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting).
103 Id. at 95-111 (Harlan, J., concurring).
10' U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
105

E.g., Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702-04 (1864) (undelivered
opinion of Taney, C.J.) (judgments must be final and conclusive on the parties,
and the power to insure execution must rest in the judicial tribunal). Compare
Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467-69 (1930), with
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 274-78
(1933) (administrative rather than judicial function performed by court below).
See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
106E.g., Ex parte Batesville & Brinkley R.R., 39 Ark. 82, 87 (1822): "We
understand that the framers of our [Arkansas] Constitution, when they speak of
'appellate jurisdiction,' meant the review by a superior court of the final judgment,
order or decree of some inferior court."
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ment the exercise of the jurisdiction.' T This functional approach to
appellate jurisdiction means that review is not limited to decisions of
whatever "inferior courts" Congress may establish under article III,
but extends to any case or controversy falling within article III, section
2 and initially heard by any tribunal exercising judicial power. Thus
the Supreme Court has not differentiated cases according to the source
of their judicial power, but has heard cases coming from state courts
and from courts exercising article I judicial power.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,""8 Mr. Justice Story employed a
functional definition of appellate review, as applied to state court decisions, pursuant to section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The
judges of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, criticizing Justice
Story's first decision in the case, had argued that:
[t]he term supreme must be understood in reference to the
Inferior Courts immediately before mentioned; and it must
be in relation to them, and not to the State Courts, that the
Supreme Court is to exercise appellate jurisdiction. It has
been contended that the constitution contemplated only the
objects of appeal, and not the tribunals from which the
appeal is to be taken . . . . But this argument proves too
much . . . . It would give appellate jurisdiction, as well
over the courts of England or France, as over the State
courts ....
1o9
In rebuttal, Justice Story said:
The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third
article to any particular courts. The words are, "the judicial
power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all
cases" . . . . It is the case, then, and not the court, that
gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the
case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it
depends." 0
This language is broad enough to embrace any tribunal which exercises
the federal judicial power.
That it is the nature of the case which gives the Supreme Court
the power to review is supported by the Court's treatment of appeals
07
1 See 2 J. STORY, supra note 18, at § 1761. Justice Story explains that the term
"appeal" had a variety of meanings in various parts of the country when the Constitution was adopted. He attempts an "abstract" definition of the term, defining it
to be "nothing more, than the power of one tribunal to review the proceedings of
another." Id. § 1764. He points out that "an appeal from one jury to another is

familiar both in language and in practice [in New England]. . .

."

Id.

Because

Story had already established in § 1761 that the Constitution requires a case or controversy and a judicial proceeding for the Court to take an appeal, by inference any
judicial tribunal would satisfy those conditions.
1D8 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
109 Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 13-14 (1815).
110 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 338 (emphasis added).
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from 'legislative courts" "' which are technically not within the federal
judicial system," but rather may be considered "agencies of the legislative or executive branch" "' or delegates of congressional power to
be exercised for specific purposes.'
Congressional power to create
legislative courts is derived not from article III, but from article I and
the necessary and proper clause." 5 Creatures of legislative power
under article I, legislative courts are not limited to performing judicial
functions nor restricted in any way by article 111.11 Specifically, they
may be requested to give advisory opinions on legislation "7 and to
exercise administrative discretion."" When the Supreme Court has
been given the power to review the decisions of legislative courts on
direct appeal or certiorari, it has implicitly determined that the status
of the lower tribunal in the federal judicial system as either an article I
or an article III court is unimportant for the purposes of appellate
review." 0 Instead, as with state court decisions, the basis for permitting Supreme Court review has been the exercise by the tribunal of
judicial power. 2 ' The legislative court's ability to exercise nonjudicial
power does not preclude Supreme Court jurisdiction to review the
legislative court's judicial decisions. 2' Thus, the Court has accepted
jurisdiction to review legislative court decisions resulting from an
exercise of judicial power "=but rejected appellate jurisdiction, even
when provided by statute, when the proceedings in legislative courts
"ll Legislative courts are created by Congress under its article I, § 8 powers to
implement its own functions (for example, to collect taxes, to pay claims against
the United States, or to establish a system of military justice).
2
1' But cf. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1964)
defining "court of the United States," inter
alia, as "any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled
to hold office during good behavior." The section is only for legislative convenience
and not indicative of the constitutional position of legislative courts staffed with
judges having good behavior tenure granted by Congress.
113 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 599 (1962) (Douglas & Black, JJ.,
dissenting).
114 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1929); see Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543-52 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.). Although Glidden
overruled Bakelite on the issue of the true nature of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, it left undisturbed the determination of Bakelite and its progeny
that review of the judicial decisions of legislative courts was a proper exercise of
appellate jurisdiction. In fact, United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894), permitting
direct review from the Court of Private Land Claims, was cited with approval in
Glidden.
115 American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
116 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 598-602 (1962) (Douglas & Black, 3J.,
dissenting).
117 See, e.g., In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 226 (1893).
118 E.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 467-69
(1930) ; United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 46-47 (1851).

119 See

THE

CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmiucA: ANALYSIS AD

INTERmPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 594 (1964).
:2 See id.
1 21
See Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1944).
122Id. at 12-14 (Court of Claims); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 275-78 (1933) (Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1894) (Court of
Private Land Claims).
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below did not reflect an exercise of judicial power. 23 Because decisions of state courts and article I courts, as well as those of article III
courts, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court, any tribunal which
exercises judicial power-as does the Judicial Conference-may be
subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court."2
State courts interpreting state constitutions similar to the Federal
Constitution have come directly to grips with the problem. To speed
appellate review of state administrative bodies, it is a common practice
to provide direct state supreme court review of their decisions. A
situation analogous to the federal constitutional question under discussion here arises whenever, in order to uphold the legislation establishing direct review, the state supreme court must find that direct
review of the administrative body would be an exercise of appellate
rather than original jurisdiction. Although some courts have held
themselves unable to review the decision of the administrative tribunal,
they have stated in dicta that direct appellate review would have been
constitutional had the tribunal performed a judicial function."
In at least one instance, a state court has exercised its appellate
jurisdiction to review a removal decision of a lower tribunal similar to
the Judicial Conference. In Hastings v. Board of County Commissioners,2 6 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the decision of the
Board of County Commissioners to remove a county highway super123 See, e.g., Federal Radio Comm'n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 468-70
(1930); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 444 (1923) (Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia) ; In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 227 (1893) ;
Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 699-702 (1864) (undelivered opinion of
Taney, C.J.) (Court of Claims) ; Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 253
(1863) (alternative holding) (military commission).
124 Congress may give article I judicial power to administrative agencies, see
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 400 (1940), and decline to
create inferior federal courts, leaving judicial remedies to the states. See JAFFE
supra note 41, at 87-92. States can usually apportion judicial power as they see fit. See
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908). The Framers of the
Constitution intended that questions concerning the Constitution or acts of Congress
or other disputes included within article III, § 2 be finally decided by the Supreme
Court under its appellate jurisdiction. See H. HART & H. WEcsLER, THaE FEDERAL
Thus, it is possible that the only
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 17-18 (1953).
way the Court may exercise its appellate jurisdiction is to directly review these state
tribunals.
1 5 See In re Cumberland Power Co., 147 Tenn. 504, 515, 249 S.W. 818, 821
(1923) ("It is apparent that the word 'court,' as used in our Constitution, means
the medium for the exercise of judicial power of the state, and connotes the ordinary
attributes of judicial tribunals." Id. at 508, 249 S.W. at 819) ; United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 73 W. Va. 571, 580, 80 S.E. 931, 935 (1914) ("[T]he
appellate jurisdiction of this court is limited by the Constitution . . . to judicial

matters, and . . . we have no power to review . . . decisions of an inferior tribunal,

officer or board, as to matters which are merely administrative, executive or legislative, and not strictly judicial in nature, except when such power may be expressly conferred by the Constitution." Id. at 576-77, 80 S.E. at 933) ; Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Dodd, 105 Miss. 23, 46-47, 61 So. 743, 744-45 (1913) (appellate review defined
as revisory power over a "judicial decision, rendered by a tribunal clothed with
judicial power." Id. at 43, 61 So. at 743); Auditor v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 6
Kan. 500, 508 (1870) ("The tribunal from which an appeal lies need not be called a
court, but it must be one having the attributes of a court; a tribunal where justice is
judicially administered, that is, according to law." Id. at 506).
:126205 Ind. 687, 188 N.E. 207 (1933).
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intendent was a judicial action by a judicial tribunal and therefore
reviewable in the appellate jurisdiction of an intermediate, appellate
court. Furthermore, the court reaffirmed its earlier holdings that the
Board was to be considered a court because it exercised the powers of
a court of record, 27 even though, as the dissent pointed out,
[t]he board of commissioners is not made a part of our
judicial system by the Constitution and can be a part only in
case the General Assembly has so declared under its power
conferred by § 1, Art. VII [to create inferior courts]. No
act of the General Assembly has ever declared the board of
county commissioners to be a court. 28
In effect, then, the Indiana court held that, when a tribunal has the
essential attributes of a court, exercises judicial power, and performs a
judicial function, it will be treated as a court for purposes of appellate
review.
2. Appellate Review of Bodies Not Called "Courts"
An examination of the language of some federal and state cases
might suggest that appellate jurisdiction extends only to review of
decisions made by bodies specifically denominated "courts." ' As
demonstrated above, however, this view disregards the general functional concept of appellate review adopted in the federal system. And
3

27

See State v. Connor, 5 Blackford (Ind.) 325, 326 (1840).

128205 Ind. at 696, 188 N.E. at 210.

The dissent found that the board had
exercised
quasi-judicial
powers.
29
1 Marbury v. Madison may also cast some doubt upon the constitutionality
of the provision for the Supreme Court review on certiorari of decisions of
the Judicial Conference about the removal of an unfit judge. Since the
Supreme Court would not be reviewing a decision of the lower court, there
well may be a claim that any jurisdiction it exercised would be original.
Letter from judge Clement F. Haynsworth to Lee Miller, Deputy Counsel of the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, June 12, 1969, on file in Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Judge Haynsworth stressed
that this is not necessarily his considered opinion, but merely a side of the issue
he believed should be raised. Letter from Judge Clement F. Haynsworth to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Jan. 28, 1970, on file in Biddle Law
Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
The argument favoring this position draws an analogy from the treatment of
administrative orders before the courts of appeals, which have held that their review
of the orders of administrative agencies pursuant to congressional enactments is in
the exercise of original (rather than appellate) jurisdiction on the grounds that they are
"the first forum in which a judicial hearing can be had to determine the legality of
the order." Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 128 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1942) ;
see New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346,
355 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 311 (1965); C.E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241
F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1957), vacated per curiarn on other grounds sub noin. Moog
Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958); FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615, 618-19 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928).
State courts have declared that "even
where the statutes provide for an appeal it is said that the Court does not, strictly
speaking, exercise appellate jurisdiction, since there can be no appeal in the legal
sense from the order of an administrative body." Southern Ry. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 195 S.C. 247, 254, 10 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1940); see Clark v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 78 Colo. 48, 51-52, 239 P. 20, 21 (1925); De Constantin v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 75 W. Va. 32, 33, 83 S.E. 88 (1914).
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such language is largely attributable to an equation of judicial power
with the power exercised by a court.
Mr. Justice Story's statement in section 1761 of his Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States illustrates this approach:
In reference to judicial tribunals, an appellate jurisdiction,
therefore, necessarily implies that the subject matter has been
instituted and acted upon by some other court, whose judgment or proceeding is to be revised. .

.

. To operate at all

then, under the Constitution of the United States, it is not
sufficient that there has been a decision by some officer or
department of the United States; it must be by one clothed
with judicial authority and acting in a judicial capacity. 3 '
Because Story apparently equates tribunals exercising judicial power
and courts, he would find permissible Supreme Court review of a
judicial tribunal not called a court.
Those state cases apparently rejecting the notion of appellate
review of bodies not called courts take the literal view that appeals
may be taken only from inferior to superior courts. 3 ' But the state
courts adopting this view have done so after construing constitutional
provisions requiring strict separation of powers-provisions peculiar to
their own constitutions and absent from the Federal Constitution
which allows Congress to give article I judicial power to bodies which
are not article III courts. Because in these states the constitutions in
effect require that only the constitutional courts exercise judicial power,
the position that appeals may be taken only from inferior courts is not
inconsistent with those state decisions, discussed above,"*2 finding appellate review of the exercise of judicial power appropriate. Those
permitting review only of inferior courts faced no need to investigate
the functions of the body below, but only to decide by constitutional
construction whether a particular body qualifies as a court. Because
the Judicial Conference under S. 1506 is constitutionally given article
III judicial power, the line of state cases adhering to the functional
approach is most persuasive authority for direct Supreme Court review
of the Conference.
3. Summary
Although congressional motives for not explicitly indicating in
S. 1506 that the Judicial Conference is to sit as a "court" when decidJ. STORY, supra note 18, at § 1761 (emphasis added).
131 See Ex parte Allen, 26 Ark. 9, 13 (1870); Clark v. Public Util. Comm'n,
78 Colo. 48, 52, 239 P. 20, 21 (1925); In re Manufacturer's Freight Forwarding
Co., 294 Mich. 57, 68-69, 292 N.W. 678, 680-81 (1940); Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac.
RR. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 64 S.D. 297, 306, 266 N.W. 660, 664 (1936);
Winner Milling Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 43 S.D. 574, 575, 181 N.W. 195, 196
(1921).
132 Notes 124-28 mipra & accompanying text.
130 2
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ing removal cases are not apparent, the resolution of the constitutional
questions of appellate jurisdiction turns not on such formalistic considerations, but on the more functional view that a body which acts like
a court should be treated like a court for the purposes of review. 3
Whether the Conference may be directly reviewed by the Supreme
Court depends on whether the Conference exercises judicial power
and renders a judicial decision when it removes a federal judge. That
power is historically judicial, may be granted by Congress to the
judicial branch, and may be lawfully exercised by the Conference.
Thus Congress may constitutionally grant the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision to remove a judge.
B. Supervisory Power Theory
The Supreme Court may review the decision of the Judicial
Conference on the alternative theory that the Court itself has the
inherent power to remove lower federal judges failing to meet the
good behavior standard. According to this theory, the Judicial Conference need not be, or be treated as, a court because the Court would
be exercising neither original nor appellate jurisdiction in an action to
judicially remove a judge under its supervisory power. 34
Professor Shartel has argued' 3 5 that, in addition to securing to
the Supreme Court the powers inherent in any court of law,' the grant
of "judicial Power" to "one supreme Court" also included the inherent
power of a common law "supreme court" (the King's Bench) at the
time of the drafting of the Constitution. This grant embraces the
power to oversee the administration of justice in inferior courts and to
supervise the actions of all the officers and personnel of the judicial
133 Under an extension of Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Conference, because it exercises judicial power and performs a judicial function, is
created a court without being so named. Glidden Co., by its emphasis on the characteristics and functions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, implies that
whenever a body has the characteristics of an article III court, it is an article III
court---even if Congress has not specifically called it such. See Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 233, 238 (1908) (separate dissenting opinions of Fuller,
C.J. & Harlan, J.) (the Virginia State Corporation Commission is a court because the
Virginia Constitution, art. XII, § 156(e) gives it the powers of a court of record);
Hastings v. Board of County Comm'rs, 205 Ind. 687, 188 N.E. 207 (1933) (Board
of County Commissioners is a court because it exercises the powers of a court of
record) ; Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld. Raym. 454, 469, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1212 (K.B.
1700) (Lord Chief Justice Holt implied that the College of Physicians was created
by statute as a court inferior to the Court of King's Bench).
134 The exercise of an inherent jurisdiction is neither appellate nor original in
nature. See Shartel, supra note 4, at 889 n.54.
135 Id. 723, 730-36 (part II).
136 E.g., contempt power, power to admit and to disbar attorneys, and the power
to make rules of practice and procedure for the court. See cases cited notes 19-21
supra & accompanying text. Authority indicating that these powers are inherent
in the Supreme Court can be found on the first page of Supreme Court records. In
the February term of 1790, the Court laid down standards for admission to its bar
and the oath required of attorneys practicing before it. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 399 (1790).
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system, 13 7 just as the judge of a lower court has supervisory powers
over officers in his court. 3 " Necessary to the power of supervision
is the power of removal of unfit officers.
The argument that the Court has supervisory powers over lower
federal courts has been strengthened by the language of the Court
itself. The Court has recognized its supervisory power over the
administration of justice in the federal system.139 This includes the
power to supervise criminal procedure and the administration of criminal justice,' 40 to formulate rules of procedure and practice for lower
federal courts,' 4 ' and to regulate the administration of justice in federal
Furthermore, by invoking its supervisory powers the
agencies.' 4
43
Court has heard cases demanding reversal which were not appealable.
The rationale for the exercise of these supervisory powers by the
Court is equally applicable to a decision on the issue of the fitness of
a judge to continue in office. The scope of a regular court's inherent
power extends to the supervision of the
conduct of parties, witnesses and counsel in a case, as well as
the conduct of the jurors and officers of the court [because
this conduct] may be of such character as not only to defeat
the rights of litigants but it may directly affect the administration of public justice. In the very nature of things the courts
of each jurisdiction must each be in a position to adopt and
enforce their own self-preserving rules.'"
-137EX parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 192 (1831). The Court recognized the
superintending power of the Court of King's Bench, the superior court in the English
system, and quoted favorably from 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARMS *110:
For it is the peculiar business of the court of king's bench to superintend all
other inferior tribunals, and therein to enforce the due exercise of those
judicial or ministerial powers with which the crown or legislature have
invested them; and this, not only by restraining their excesses, but also by
quickening their negligence, and obviating their denial of justice.
The Court of King's Bench was also the removing forum where the patent of office of
a judge was tried. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
(disbarring of attorney by
138 EX parte Wall, 107 U.S. (17 Otto) 265 (1882)
a circuit and district court upheld).
39
'
See generally Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76
-ARv. L. Rv.1656 (1963).

See also Hoffa v.
140 See NcNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 728 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Mesarosh v. United
States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956).
This power is discussed
'41 E.g., The Equity Rules of 1912, 226 U.S. 627 (1912).
in Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, Inc., 194 F.2d 422, 426 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Clark, J., concurring). See generally Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to Make
Rules of Appellate Procedure,49 HARv. L. REv. 1303, 1311-17 (1936) ; Paul, The RuleMaking Power of the Courts, 1 WAsH. L. REv. 223, 225-26 (1926).
142
See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124-25
(1956).
143 See Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 676-77 (1944) and
cases cited therein.
14 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915).
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Affirming the inherent power of a circuit court to remove an attorney,
the Supreme Court stated that "the courts ought not to hesitate . . .
to protect themselves from scandal and contempt, and the public from
prejudice, by removing grossly improper persons from participation in
the administration of the laws." 145
As a court in the judicial system, the Supreme Court has at least
the same powers as the inferior courts. Moreover, lower court judges
may be considered inferior officers with respect to the Court.Y6 In
any event, the Court's supervision of the administration of justice
should reach all personnel involved in that process. Certainly the
rationale behind this supervisory power extends to the removal of
lower federal judges. The Court has recognized that
fastidious regard to the honor of the administration of
justice requires the Court to make certain that the doing of
justice be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse
claims of its disregard can be asserted.14 7
More than a corrupt attorney or a bribed officer, a judge unfit
for office affects the administration of justice and casts scorn on the
judicial system. When a judge becomes a "grossly improper" person
to administer justice, the Court should have the inherent supervisory
power to remove him. This action need not await an appeal in a particular case-it is most effective upon initial complaint. Supervision
based upon a long-range view of public interest protects all litigants
before the bench-surely the Court may exercise this inherent power
in the first instance to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
If the removal of a judge is within the Court's inherent power,
Congress may establish machinery for the exercise of that power under
the necessary and proper clause. The Court need not be the sole trier
of fact; Congress could establish a commission-conference system to
aid the Court by first passing on the fitness of the judge as proposed
in S. 1506. The Court would review the decision of the Conference
just as a district court reviews the decision of a master.
CONCLUSION

An efficient procedure for the removal of unfit judges is very
desirable in a political system which places its faith in the judiciary to
resolve disputes fairly. The draftsmen of S. 1506 chose the commission-conference method of removal from among many alternatives to
impeachment, for they believed that the judiciary is constitutionally
145 EX parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
146
14 7

(1956).

Shartel, supra note 4, at 499-529.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124
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responsible for keeping its own house in order. This Comment has
discussed the nature of the constitutional limits on judicial removal
machinery and has concluded that S. 1506 conforms to those requirements. It is also well conceived in policy.
Any judicial removal scheme should include several desirable
characteristics. First, the removal power should be vested in a single
body: decisions are likely to be uniform, and close public scrutiny is
facilitated.' 48 Second, the removing body should be a tribunal superior
to the judge whose conduct is being examined: only superiors should
remove inferiors, even when federal judges are involved. 4" Third, the
removing tribunal's objectivity should be beyond question: individual
judges' feelings of independence as well as fundamental feelings of fairness deserve protection. Finally, removal should be accomplished by a
group as representative as possible of the federal judiciary as a whole:
the problem of judicial ethics and behavior is common to all judges,
and regional or ideological biases should be minimized.
The Supreme Court would be an ideal removal body. But because
the trial of a judge's good behavior is not included within the original
jurisdiction of the Court, Congress may not grant the Court removal
power. 8 0
Earlier bills have either given removal power to a specially created
court with jurisdiction to hear only removal cases,' 51 or to an already
established court."m The decision of the draftsmen of S. 1506 to give
the removal power to the Judicial Conference is in many ways superior
to previous proposals.8 3 Certainly the removal power is vested in a
148 Congress can vest exclusive jurisdiction in one federal court. See Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429-30 (1944) ; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187
(1943).
149 See generally Shartel, supra note 4, at 889-91; Note, New Alternatives to an
Old Problem, supra note 5, at 1402-04.
180 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
151 E.g., S. 4527, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), creating a "High Court for the
Trial of Judicial Officers" consisting of the chief judges from each of the 10 circuits,
and presided over by the chief judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.
152 E.g., H.R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), giving the removal power to the
"circuit court of appeals in which the judge resides." The bill further provided that,
when a circuit judge is tried, no judge of the same circuit shall serve on the removal
court. The Chief Justice was given the power to assign any circuit judge to the
court for the purposes of the special session. The trial was to be by a three-judge
court.
153 The institution of a commission system is by far the most fundamental departure of S. 1506 from earlier judicial removal bills. The draftsmen of the bill
rested their decision on the success of the California Commission on Judicial Qualifications. 114 CONG. REc. 4558 (1968) (remarks of Senator Tydings). See generally
Hearings on S. 3055, supra note 22. The commission plan has been widely recommended over proposals providing only for a single trial of a judge before a court:
the commission's permanent staff may more easily dispose of frivolous charges and

conduct investigations of a judge without publicity. In addition, the commission

system provides a means of suggesting to a judge that he resign or retire, or of
informally warning a judge whose misconduct is only slight. See New Ways to

Deal with Judicial Misconduct, 48 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 163, 164 (1965)

(editorial);
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single body. In most removal cases, the Conference judges will be
peers of or superior to the judge in question. The Conference stands
between the Supreme Court and the lower federal judiciary, 154 and is
already regarded as a tribunal exercising some supervisory powers over
the lower federal judiciary by its mandate to propose and examine
rules of practice and its power to make plans for the assignment of
judges to the various circuits in the interests of uniformity and expedition of court business. It has also played a supervisory role over
the off-the-bench behavior of federal judges, and has represented the
federal judiciary as a whole in its recommendations to Congress on
legislation. Thus the Conference is a single body capable of producing
uniform decisions and easily scrutinized by the public, as well as a
forum historically acting as a supervisory, "superior" tribunal and
manned with judges who in most instances will be superior to those
whose good behavior is on trial.
Perhaps the most important criteria for a judicial removal body
are its objectivity and representative nature. Thus the removal power
should not be granted to judicial tribunals too closely associated with
the judge being examined.' 5 Whether proximity would work for or
against any particular judge in question, close, daily association might
interfere with removal decisions concerning fellow jurists on the same
court. Even the immediately superior judges in a circuit might lack
proper objectivity when asked to remove a judge whose decisions they
continually review. In any event, even the appearance of subjectivity
diminishes the feeling of individual judicial independence required by
the constitutional standard of good behavior tenure.
The Conference, drawing from all the circuits and the specialized
courts, is more representative and probably less subject to personal,
Note, The Chandler Incident and the Problems of Judicial Removal, supra note 5, at
458; Note, Alternatives to Impeachment, supra note 5, at 731-32.
Earlier bills gave discretionary power to bring an action either to the Attorney

General, e.g., S. 4527, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), or to the House of Representa-

tives, the court of appeals merely taking the place of the Senate for trial after
impeachment proceedings, e.g., H.R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). Neither of
these approaches is particlularly wise. First, if the power of removal is inherent
in the judiciary, then under the separation of powers doctrine no other branch may
participate in the exercise of this power. An executive oversight of the judicial
branch is clearly unconstitutional. Executive power was rejected by the Framers,
notes 14 & 27 supra & accompanying text, who gave the power of removal only to the
legislature, by impeachment, and to the courts as an inherent power. The House
bill is also unacceptable: impeachment is technically different from judicial removal
and the two forms should not be mixed. The legislature has no role to play in
the performance of an inherent judicial function.
Second, the major objections to impeachment, note 5 supra, were not cured by
the earlier bills. Neither the innocent judge nor the judicial system was protected
from wrongful and destructive publicity, or from politically motivated proceedings.
The commission-conference system, however, meets these objections.
54

See generally F. FRANKFuRTmR & J. LANDis, supra note 78, at 242-52.
115 This problem of association is especially noticeable in systems retaining the
removal power within the courts of a single circuit. E.g., H.R. 146, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941) (discussed at notes 152 & 153 supra).
3'
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regional, or ideological bias than any particular trial or circuit court
already established: ..6 Individual judicial independence is admirably
protected. Congress would be wise to grant the removal power to the
Conference.
Stewart A. Block

156 Some commentators have suggested that the Judicial Council of each individual
circuit remove judges within its circuit. See Note, Alternatives to Impeachment,
supra note 5, at 733 (rejecting the Judicial Conference because too unwieldy with 25
judges). But the Judicial Conference has been supported over the Councils as being
more representative of the federal judiciary as a whole and less subject to bias in
the trial of a brethren judge. See Hearings on S. 3055, supra note 22, at 56-57, 101,
263; Note, New Alternatives to an Old Problem, supra note 5, at 1404. The hearing
before the Judicial Council is no more than a hearing by the court of appeals of the
circuit. See Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 133 (1970) (Douglas &
Black, JJ., dissenting) (Chandler II) ; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
at 18, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).

